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Abstract 
We examined the effects of Vietnamese enterprise zones on local businesses based on different 
patterns of place-based policies as well as the ownership structure of the zone infrastructure 
developers (ZIDs). We constructed a panel of communes during 2000–2007 using a census 
survey of firms having more than nine employees and a census of zones and zone-based firms. 
We found that place-based policies led to growth in the number of jobs and firms in the 
communes where enterprise zones were located, even after excluding zone-based firms. Our 
findings also suggest that privately owned ZIDs worked best under corporate-tax incentives, 
while zones with a designated central government agency as the ZID had adverse spillover 
effects on business development in neighboring communes of the same district. 
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1. Introduction 
Many countries have been using enterprise zones1 to achieve economies of agglomeration, 
attract (foreign) investment, alleviate unemployment, and implement special policy 
experiments2. Regardless of the form of the zone, the establishment of such zones indicates an 
interference from the government in the allocation decisions of firms via tax and other incentive 
policies or subsidies. Thus, it is debatable whether place-based policies for enterprise zones are 
effective (Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Givord et al, 2013; Hanson and Rohlin, 2013) and reach 
pareto efficiency (Kline and Moretti, 2014; Fishback, 2017), especially if they entail public 
investment.  
Until 2008, Vietnam had a unique dual, but non-overlapping, place-based policy 
system: a homogenous policy system of the central government (with corporate tax and export 
incentives) and a heterogeneous policy system of local governments (with land rent holidays). 
Each zone was subject to only one system. Interestingly, developer ownership of zone 
infrastructure has varied since the first zone was established in Vietnam in the early 1990s, 
with ownership residing with private firms, state-owned firms, and/or partnerships, including 
foreign investors. In addition, the central / local governments sometimes opted to become 
directly involved in developing and operating zone infrastructure. As a result, various patterns 
of place-based policies3 have evolved in Vietnam. 
In this paper, we build on this unique feature to estimate the direct and spillover effects 
of enterprise zones with different policy patterns on local businesses. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to consider two separate incentives: tax and land rent holidays, 
from the central government and local government, respectively. We are not aware of any 
previous study comparing the potentially different impacts of enterprise zones on local 
businesses, depending on the nature of ownership of the zone infrastructure developers (ZID). 
In addition, previous studies often focused on policies and incentives, but not on how the zone 
was developed and operated, especially if the developer was owned by a public or private 
                                                 
1 See Akinci et al. (2008) for a detailed zone classification and its history of development worldwide. 
2 We acknowledge that “race-to-the-bottom” zones (such as lowering requirements in environment and labor 
regulations) also exist. 
3 This is different from the definition of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China. According to Wang (2013), the 
central government did not directly interfere in SEZs. A designated administrative committee, set up by and on 
behalf of the local government, was allowed to build and improve infrastructure. 
  
3 
enterprise. Moreover, rather than just the one-to-one spatial spillover effect (the spillover effect 
of a single enterprise zone at a time), this study considered the spatial spillover effects of 
various zone policies on every area not covered under any specific zone. This approach differs 
from previous concentric ring analyses such as Zheng et al. (2017) and Lu et al. (2018). 
Moreover, while our study is closely related to Lu et al. (2018), it differed not only in terms of 
the above contributions but also because we were able to identify zone-based firms, which Lu 
et al. (2018) were not. Our study is also among the few studies in the relevant literature that 
used the census data of a country.  
More specifically, we focused on whether a zone’s economic activities influenced local 
businesses. We defined a treated commune/district as one that hosted a zone in 2007. 
Conversely, a control or untreated commune/district had no zone in 2007. Thus, a commune in 
a treated district could either be a control commune or a treated one (see Figure 1). In terms of 
Vietnamese administrative divisions, the commune is the third level of administration, just 
below that of the district4. The place-based policies were applied only to zone-based firms. 
Local businesses were firms located outside the zone boundary. They operated in either 
treatment or control communes, and as such, were not eligible for the place-based policies. 
To construct a panel of communes, we used a census of Vietnamese formal firms 
having more than nine employees during 2000–2007 and a census survey on zones, which 
contained detailed characteristics of the zones and the firms located within the zones. We first 
selected treated districts only, limiting the selection to those that did not have any zone until 
the end of 2002 to be able to compare the treated communes before and after the policy became 
effective and to carry out a pre-treatment parallel trend check. Then, we added control districts 
to the initial selection for comparing control communes in treated districts with control 
communes in control districts. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual framework. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We applied differences-in-differences (DD) in the panel analysis with a commune fixed 
effect, district-year fixed effect, and fixed effects of the year–commune characteristics in 2000. 
We also used clustered standard errors at the commune level. Our method was similar to a 
combination of geographic discontinuity design and DD, and allowed us to distinguish between 
                                                 
4  The formal division of Vietnamese administrative units spans three levels: there were approximately 63 
provinces, 700 districts, and over 10,000 communes during 2000–2007. 
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zone-based firms and other local businesses. Finally, we added a concentric ring analysis to 
estimate the spatial spillover effects from any enterprise zone to untreated communes in various 
data selections.  
In general, we found that place-based policies led to a growth in both employment and 
the number of firms in the communes where the enterprise zones were located, even after 
excluding zone-based firms. Especially, we found that a private ZID under the regulation of 
the central government would perform best. However, when control districts were included, 
we found that enterprise zones developed and operated directly by the designated central 
government agency would have an adverse effect on the development of firms located in the 
control communes of the treated districts. Using concentric ring analysis, we found the spatial 
spillover effects to be limited to cases in which the treated commune was located within 0–14 
km from the center of the control commune.  
Our study is organized as the follows. Section 2 describes the heterogeneous policy 
patterns on enterprise zones in Vietnam during 2000–2007 and their unique features. Section 
3 reviews related literature, followed by description of the data used in Section 4. Section 5 
presents our identification strategies and methods. We report the results in Section 6 and 
provide additional discussion and concluding remarks in Section 7. 
2. Vietnamese enterprise zones and heterogeneous policy patterns 
during 2000–2007 
Vietnamese enterprise zones are broadly classified into two types: one under the central 
government and the other under provincial governments. The details are as follows. 
The first enterprise zone was established in Vietnam as early as 1991; however, it was 
Vietnamese Government Decree 36 (dated April 24, 1997)5 that first officially defined and 
regulated three types of enterprise zones: industrial zones, export processing zones, and high-
                                                 
5 The decree was valid until March 2008 and replaced by Government Decree 29/2008. This replacement granted 
the provincial governments the right to set up enterprise zones eligible for national place-based policies. All 
Boards were also moved under provincial governments. The prime minister only issued approvals on national and 
regional master plans of industrial zone development. However, an enterprise zone was required to already be 
included in the master plan before it could officially be established.  
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technology zones. Only zone-based firms were eligible for the corresponding place-based 
policies6.  
According to Government Decree 36, industrial zones are dedicated to industrial 
manufacturing and related services, while export processing zones are for exporting goods and 
supporting services. In contrast, high-technology zones are a centralized area for technology-
intense firms. However, regardless of type, each zone must have a defined boundary and be 
isolated from residential areas. Additionally, only the prime minister possesses the authority to 
establish these zones (hereafter, IZ7). The prime minister also established Provincial Boards of 
Industrial Zone Management directly under his authority. The Boards functioned as a “zone 
government” on behalf of the prime minister to carry out governmental administrative work, 
but they operated independently from provincial presidents. Moreover, the decree did not 
restrict the Boards from becoming ZIDs8. The Boards enjoyed direct budget resources from 
the central government. The provincial government of the area in which the IZ was located had 
limited right to interfere with the functioning of the IZ, acting mainly to clear land for 
developing the IZ and nominating board personnel. Firms wishing to located in IZs to take 
advantage of the policy benefits were required to register and undergo a board approval process.  
All IZ-based firms received the same set of benefits from the central government. For 
example, firms in high-technology zones can enjoy complete corporate-tax exemption for the 
initial eight years, and then pay only a flat 10% rate of corporate income tax, if profitable. 
Manufacturing (service) firms in export processing zones can pay just a 10% (15%) flat rate of 
corporate income tax from the fifth (second) year, if profitable. Firms in industrial zones can 
enjoy two years of full corporate tax exemption and then pay a flat corporate tax rate as low as 
10%, depending on the actual proportion of export sales over total sales.  
According to the decree, each IZ must have a ZID. The ZID could be any kind of firm 
(private, state-owned, partnership), as long as it was not entirely foreign owned. The ZID first 
contracts with the Boards for a land grant. It can then call for investors/firms to locate in the 
zone. The ZID builds, maintains the infrastructure, and then leases it to firms who later locate 
their operations in the zone. The ZID is also required to provide environmental protection 
                                                 
6 A majority of the zones were within a commune boundary; however, a district might host several zones.   
7 We used “IZ” because among zones under the central government, industrial zones were the largest in number.  
8 Vietnamese legal documents often referred to ZID as “infrastructure investors” or sometimes, “infrastructure 
operators.” 
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measures and other services for zone-based firms. In turn, the ZID also receives some 
incentives, which are even more generous than those for the potential zone-based firms. 
However, the government decree did not limit the freedom of provincial governments 
to set up their own enterprise zones. In fact, provincial governments established their own 
zones (industrial cluster, hereafter, IC), with the functions and organizational structures of ICs 
similar to those of IZs. ICs also have a definite boundary and are separated from ordinary 
residential areas. However, firms in ICs are not eligible for the generous benefits available to 
those in IZs during the years we study (2000–2007)9. ICs were also smaller in terms of area 
and scale, as seen in Table 1. Firms in ICs enjoy favorable policies from the local government, 
which must comply with national rules and regulations. Provincial governments also sought to 
name these zones in such a way as to reflect their smaller scale, using terms such as industrial 
cluster and industrial village (in Vietnamese: “cụm công nghiệp” and “làng nghề”). 
  [Insert Tables 1 here] 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no legal documents from the central 
government to regulate ICs until Government Decree 105/2009 in 2009. This decree officially 
defined ICs as we have described above and set a maximum land area of 50 hectares 
(expandable up to 75 hectares). Eight years later, Government Decree 68/2017 in May 2017 
officially recognized a set of benefit policies for IC-based firms. The main benefit was land 
rent holidays for 7 (11) years for industrial clusters (industrial villages) and up to 11 (15) years 
for infrastructure developers of industrial clusters (industrial villages). However, there were no 
tax incentives for firms in ICs. Local incumbent firms were encouraged to locate in ICs. We 
acknowledge potential variations in place-based policies among ICs.  
In short, the main differences between IZ and IC design lay in three major areas. First, 
IZs were established by the central government, while ICs were set up by local governments. 
Second, IZs had generous corporate tax incentives, while ICs had a land rent incentive package. 
Third, IZs promoted export activities, while ICs were more for local business activities. We 
note that ICs were not “losers” compared to IZs, as proposed in Hanson and Rohlin (2013); 
however, it might be considered that ICs were created with the aim to support IZs.  
                                                 
9 However, after 2007, the presidents of each province were eligible to set up all types of zones based on the 
master plan approved by the central government. Firms in such zones could enjoy tax incentive packages from 
the central government. Several amendments and new regulations added more types of zones in 2008, 2009, 2013, 
2015, and 2017.  
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3. Related literature 
There is a wealth of literature in economics that debates whether enterprise zones have 
benefited the corresponding areas; whether their cost has been recovered through their gain, if 
they were constructed and operated by public investment; and whether enterprise zones have 
accelerated local business activities immediately outside the zone and in other parts of the 
region.  
Identifying a valid control group is always the first challenge when evaluating a place-
based policy. The choice of control group can significantly influence the findings and 
conclusions (Neumark and Kolko, 2010). Neumark and Kolko (2010) also suggested that the 
ideal control group should be similar to the zone, but without the policy design.  
Geography boundary discontinuity design and its combination with differences-in-
differences analysis have been widely used in the literature (Dell, 2010; Lee and Lemieux, 
2010; Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Duranton et al, 2011; Gibbons et al, 2013; Givord et al, 2013; 
Hanson and Rohlin, 2013; Keele and Titinuik, 2015; Zheng et al, 2017; and Lu et al, 2018). 
The rationale was to be able to compare an inner zone with a tiny outer zone close to the zone 
boundary. The former was eligible for place-based policy, while the latter, as the control group, 
was not (Holmes, 1998). Even up to this point, identifying the exact geographical boundary 
has always been a challenge (Neumark and Kolko, 2010) because zone boundaries did not 
follow a standard postal code/geographic tract system. 
In addition, if a spillover effect existed and reshaped the control group, the estimated 
difference would understate the direct effect (Miguel and Kremer, 2004), or even overstate it 
in the case of a negative effect. Re-allocations of firms to the zone (Hanson and Rohlin, 2013; 
Chaurey, 2017) and competition between zone-based and local firms located near the 
boundaries (Hanson and Rohlin, 2013) were typical examples of negative effects. In addition, 
characteristic differences in the baseline between the treated and control areas were not small, 
even after controlling for the area’s fixed effects. Area characteristics such as productivity, 
transportation development, and climate could have influenced firms’ decisions regarding their 
location. These characteristics were difficult to distinguish from the effect of government 
policies (Holmes, 1998). Similarly, if a zone policy was aimed at poverty alleviation, target 
areas might have simultaneously received several favorable (place-based) policies (Briant et 
al., 2015; Neumark and Kolko, 2010). 
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Previous studies recorded several measures used to justify the selection of the control 
group. Neumark and Kolko (2010) indicated that counterfactual areas might work if using 
propensity score matching (PSM) methods and that one should not use post treatment 
characteristics for PSM. However, PSM overlooked unobservable characteristics (Neumark 
and Kolko, 2010). Gibbons et al. (2013) suggested relaxing the assumption of the spillover 
effect, by accepting boundary effects and spatial trends. In addition, Allcott (2015) showed a 
“site selection bias” in estimating the program impact when comparing ordinary program 
evaluation and randomized control trials. The bias was probably caused by a high correlation 
between the selected treatment area and its later impact.  
Some other works used “loser” and “winner” comparisons, such as Greenstone et al. 
(2010), Busso et al. (2013), Kline and Moretti (2014), and Zheng at al. (2017). They compared 
the actual zone with the runner-up candidate. This was because at the time of deciding a 
location for zone, the runner-up and the winner would have had similar characteristics. Busso 
et al. (2013) used a “placebo” area in the IZ counties as the control group and then compared 
the “loser” and “winner” after re-weighting based on the control group. However, Neumark 
and Kolko (2010) noted that other central or local government policies might affect the areas 
at the same time. For example, State Enterprise Zones, Federal Empowerment Zones, and 
Federal Enterprise Community programs co-exist in the US (Ham et al., 2011). Wang (2013) 
indicated another potential issue, namely, that the timing of the policies was not random. Thus, 
the impact might vary by time and depend on the designated area’s characteristics and 
conditions at the starting point. Wang (2013) suggested using area and area-year fixed effects 
to solve this potential issue.  
With recent advances in geocoding addresses and boundaries, some studies (Zheng et 
al., 2017; Lu et al., 2018) have suggested using concentric ring analysis. This method involves 
establishing a set of rings with a constant small step (i.e., every +2 km) around the zone. Each 
concentric ring is considered an impact area. This method can identify a critical distance at 
which the spillover effect is modest. Thus, while previous studies have considered the effects 
of a zone on the nearest untreated areas, they have not yet investigated cases in which various 
zones simultaneously influence an untreated area. 
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4. Data 
We used two main sources of data: the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (VES) 2000–2007 and the 
Vietnamese Establishment Census Survey (ECS) 2007 to create a set of panel data of 
communes during 2000–2007 for analysis. We selected this date range for three important 
reasons. First, 2000 was when the VES was initiated. Second, until the end of 2007, IZs were 
homogenously controlled and monitored by the Provincial Boards of Industrial Zone 
Management directly under the Prime Minister of Vietnam. Third, the government of Vietnam 
had almost the same cabinet form 1997 until June 26, 2006, which secured stability and 
consistency in other general policies and arrangements of the central and local governments. 
Since 2001, the VES has been conducted annually by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO) to obtain information regarding formal firms located in Vietnam, including 
their performance in the previous year. The sampling methods were altered year by year. The 
main difference across years is the cut-off points based on the number of employees of private 
firms for random sampling. The values of the cut-off points also depended on the provinces 
and varied by year. The GSO aimed to conduct a census of firms above the cut-off. The 
sampling guidelines issued by the GSO between 2000 and 2007 point to a census survey of 
firms with more than nine workers regardless of province and firm ownership10. We aggregated 
the data within all communes during 2000–2007 to construct the panel data for the communes. 
VES provided detailed information about firms’ employment, capital, sales, tax codes, and 
location (at commune level) annually. 
However, during 2000–2007, the VES did not include information on whether the firm 
was located in an IZ/IC. Thus, we had to rely on the ECS conducted by the GSO. The ECS 
aimed to collect information on all establishments, such as firms, plants, factories, firm 
branches, and governmental offices in July 2007. ECS included two important questionnaires 
regarding IZs/ICs. For IZs, the Provincial Boards of Industrial Zone Management responded 
to the questionnaires, while for ICs, a government agency on behalf of the provincial president, 
provided the responses.  
                                                 
10 Since 2008, the GSO has frequently changed this threshold in terms of the number of workers. For example, in 
2008, GSO used a 19-worker threshold for Hanoi and a 29-worker threshold for Ho Chi Minh City.   
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In the first form of these questionnaires, all establishments located in IZs/ICs in July 
2007 were listed, along with their detailed information, including registered official name and 
tax code. We used this information to identify the corresponding firm in the VES. However, 
we did not consider establishments that were a branch or a plant/factory of a larger firm11. We 
used a combination of the tax code and province code as a unique identifier in both the VES 
and ECS. We preferred to use firms having tax codes because those firms were the most 
important source of revenue for the local and/or central government. We were able to identify 
3,300 firms in the VES that were located in IZs/ICs and that satisfied all the above conditions 
in 2007.   
The second form was specifically related to the IZs/ICs. The questionnaires recorded 
detailed information regarding the exact date of establishment (based on the official decision 
to establish the zone) as well as the exact start date of operations. If the IZ/IC was still under 
construction, the expected operation date was used instead. There were 566 zones in the ECS; 
however, we used the ones established by the central government (179 IZs) or provincial 
government (265 ICs), both of which were expected to be either in operation or under 
construction. 
We also obtained other important information regarding the ZID of the IZ/IC. The ZID 
designated by the boards of industrial zone management designed, built, operated, and invested 
in the infrastructure of the IZs/ICs based on either their own standards or certain standards and 
requirements from firms who intended to locate in these zones. The ZID then made the 
infrastructure ready for lease, retaining responsibility for maintenance and factory modification 
within the IZs/ICs. The ECS contained detailed information on the ownership of the ZIDs. 
Their ownership mainly resided with “governmental agencies” (which means the zone 
management boards directly acted as ZIDs), state-owned enterprises (SOE), private-owned 
enterprises (POE), or foreign-owned enterprises (FOE). Furthermore, the ECS showed that the 
ZID was sometimes a combination of two or more of these aforementioned entities, based on 
partnerships. The ECS included detailed information about the ZID, such as name, tax codes, 
and ownership (as well as the country of origin, if any). From the ECS, we could distinguish 
IZs from ICs based on who granted the zone establishment permission.  
                                                 
11 This information was available in the ECS. 
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5. Sample selection, variables, and identification strategies 
In this section, we explain the empirical strategies used to answer our two primary questions, 
namely, the direct effects and the spillover effects of enterprise zones on local businesses. 
5.1 Direct effect analysis 
5.1.1. Sample selection criteria, outcome variables, and control variables 
We used each commune in each year as an observation unit. Our sample selection 
strategy was to secure the validity of conducting a difference-in-difference analysis. All 
communes in the selected sample should have at least some years during 2000–2007 without 
any IZ/IC. We selected 2003 as the earliest year any selected commune could host an IZ/IC to 
be able to compare the treated communes before and after the policy became effective and for 
a pre-treatment parallel trend check 12 . Further, the analysis was restricted to “treated” 
communes, which are defined as communes with an IZ or IC that started their operation 
between 2003 and 2007, and “control” communes, which are defined as communes with no IZ 
or IC between 2000 and 2007, but belonging to the same district as the treated communes. We 
acknowledged that the location choice to build IZs/ICs was endogenous. For example, most 
IZs/ICs found on the website of Vietnamese industrial zones (www.industrialzone.vn) are 
conveniently located with respect to international hubs (international airports, seaports, and 
railroads) and major cities. Therefore, it was difficult to select a counterfactual 
location/commune whose baseline characteristics were equivalent to those of the treated 
location/commune. This was simply because there were not many choices left.  
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, selecting control communes from the same 
district as the treated commune(s) would be the best approach, given the information 
available13. We argue that control communes in the districts with treated commune(s) would 
have the most similar baseline characteristics (year 2000)14, at least in terms of location. In 
addition, when choosing the candidates for setting up an IZ/IC, policymakers may have placed 
                                                 
12 The difference between treated and control communes might be significant; however, we can only test a parallel 
trend before the treatment time. 
13 We did not have luxury of transparent information about the history of IZ/EC establishment and detailed 
information on how policymakers chose the zone, as found in Zheng et al. (2017). 
14 We tested the differences in characteristics in the baseline year, as shown in Appendix 4. They were similar in 
terms of distance to international airports and seaports in Vietnam. 
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some of the control communes in the same district as treated communes located in the shortlist. 
This sample selection criteria yielded 62 communes with IZs and 122 with ICs, and the 
resulting sample comprised 1,971 communes in 124 treated districts. We were able to construct 
a balanced panel of 1,971 communes for the eight-year period. The descriptive statistics can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
From VES, we calculated two important outcome variables for each commune in each 
year: the logarithm of the total number of workers (𝐿𝑛(𝐿)) and the logarithm of the total 
number of formal firms (𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)) for any formal firm having more than nine employees 
located in each commune in each year.  
 For control variables, we deployed four different baseline characteristics calculated for 
each commune in 2000 from VES, including the logarithm of total capital and sales per worker 
in formal firms located in the commune, distance to nearest seaport, and distance to nearest 
international airport. We compared these characteristics in Appendix 4. The distances to 
seaports and international airports were not statistically significant; however, the others were 
significantly different at various statistical confidence levels15. We controlled the differences 
in characteristics in the baseline by interacting these characteristics with year dummies (notated 
as 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) and district-year dummies (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) as suggested by 
Wang (2013).  
5.1.2. Empirical specification and identification strategy for direct effect analysis  
First, to check for parallel trends, we estimated the following equation: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑡 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑡 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑘𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 ×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡,     (1) 
where 𝑖 notates commune and 𝑡 notates year (2000–2007). 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 are the two outcome 
variables mentioned in Section 5.1.1 for commune 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝐼𝑍𝑖 is the IZ-specific treatment 
commune dummy, and 𝐼𝐶𝑖 is the IC-specific treatment dummy. Variable 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 represents the 
year fixed effect, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 is the commune fixed effect, and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the fixed effect 
of district 𝑘  where commune 𝑖  is located. Variable  𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  is the baseline 
                                                 
15 Therefore, at least among the selected districts, the decision to choose a commune to host a zone would be based 
on the advantages of the location rather than on social programs (such as unemployment elimination). Thus, this 
is different from the Regional Selective Assistance in the UK (Criscuolo et al., 2019), the Indiana Enterprise Zone 
program (Papke, 1994), and the New Deal in the US (Fishback, 2017).  
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characteristics-year interaction term. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level. The 
statistical significance of 𝜃1𝑡 and 𝜃2𝑡, for the years of 2000 and 2001 (considering 2002 as a 
base category) would be a validation test of DD estimations. They ideally should be statistically 
insignificant.   
Then we modified Equation (1) to estimate the following main specification: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
+𝛼3𝑘𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
            (2) 
where 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 takes 1 if an IZ (or IC) in commune 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is in operation. 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 
acted as difference-in-differences estimators and identified how much the policy on IZs/ICs 
influenced the outcomes.  
 In addition, distinguished from previous literature, we can identify (A) the time when 
the zone was under construction, and (B) the composition of the ZID. Therefore, for our main 
estimations, we were able to add two sets of detailed dummies. We assumed that the time of 
the establishment decision coincided with the starting point of constructing the zone. We 
denoted any time in and after the year of zone establishment by a dummy 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 for 
the hosting commune. We also assumed that the construction duration lasted until the zone was 
ready for renting out for the first time. Similarly, during this construction period, we used 
dummy 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 to indicate this condition. We added another dummy 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 to denote any 
time when and after the zone was first ready for renting out. Thus, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 covered both 
𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡. 
For (A), we estimated:  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖 ×  𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖 ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  ×  𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽5𝑘𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ,
            (3) 
where 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 takes 1 if an IZ (or IC) in commune 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is still under construction. All 
other notations are the same as those in Equation (2).  
For (B), we estimated: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑙 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  ×  𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑙 
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+𝛾2𝑚 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  × 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑚 
+𝛾3𝑘𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 ,
            (4). 
where 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  takes 1 as IZ (or IC) in commune 𝑖  in year 𝑡  was established
16 . 
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑙 (𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑚) was ownership of the ZID of an IZ (IC) in commune 𝑖. It could 
be a 𝑃𝑂𝐸, 𝑆𝑂𝐸, 𝐹𝑂𝐸, or direct designated governmental agency (𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦). 
They correspond to the four types of ZID for all zones in Vietnam. As place-based policies 
were homogenous among IZs during 2000–2007, 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑙  identified the difference in 
infrastructure operation.  
5.2 Spillover effects and ring analysis 
5.2.1. Sample selection criteria and variables 
In the previous subsection (5.1), we used only the sample of districts having 
commune(s) with IZs or ICs between 2003 and 2007. We called those “treated” districts (but 
having both “treated” and “control” communes). In this subsection, we pooled communes in 
the “treated” districts and communes in “control” districts. Control districts are districts in 
which communes did not have any IZs or ICs between 2000 and 2007. Thus, all communes in 
these control districts are control communes. These control districts acted as “placebo” areas, 
similar to the approach applied in Busso et al. (2013).  
For the outcome variables, we calculate “net” variables for each commune in each year: 
the logarithm of the total net number of workers (𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿)) and the logarithm of the total net 
number of formal firms (𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)). These are obtained by deducting the number in each 
zone (IZ or IC) from the total number in each commune each year. So, 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿)  and 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)  in control communes are equal to the logarithms of the total number of 
workers and firms, respectively. For treated communes, these values indicate the net outcomes 
for local businesses located outside the IZ/IC border but within the treated commune. In 
addition, we followed Vu and Yamada (2017) to impute zero values. For control variables, we 
use the same set of variables described in section 5.1.1. The descriptive statistics can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
16 We did not divide 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  into 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  and 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  as Equation (3) because the set of dummies 
became fragmented. 
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5.2.2. Empirical specification and identification strategy for spillover effects and ring analysis 
For the first spillover analysis, we estimated the following equation: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  × 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  ×  𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽5 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6 × 𝐼𝐶. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽7 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑞𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
+𝛽9𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,    
           (5) 
where 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is each of the two net variables (𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿)and 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)), 
discussed above. 𝐼𝑍. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡  takes 1 at year t if any IZ is in operation in a district 
n without an IC. District n contains commune i. Similarly, 𝐼𝐶. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡  takes 1 at 
year t if there is any IC in operation in a district n without an IZ. However, if both IC and IZ 
are in operation at year t in the same district n, 𝐼𝑍. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑡 takes 1. 𝛽1-𝛽4 shows 
the difference between treated communes and control communes of the same treated district. 
Meanwhile, 𝛽5-𝛽6 indicates the spillover effects into the control communes of treated districts 
compared with other control communes in control districts. 
Next, we repeated the exercise in Equation (4) in this new sample selection in the 
following equation: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑙 × 𝐼𝑍𝑖  × 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑙 
+𝛾2𝑚 × 𝐼𝐶𝑖  × 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑚 
+𝛽3𝑘 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑘 
+𝛽4𝑜 × 𝐼𝐶. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑜 
+𝛽5𝑛𝑝 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑝 
+𝛽6𝑞𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑞𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 
 (6) 
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where 𝐼𝑍. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑝  takes 1 when it 
corresponds to one out of four types17 of ZID ownership if: (a) treated district n contains two 
or more treated communes; and (b) both IZ and IC were established and represented in the 
district n in year t. 𝐼𝑍. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑛 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑛𝑘 takes 1 in similar 
conditions except that district n had only IZ(s) at year t. 
Our previous estimations using Equations (2)–(4) and the “net value” of the outcomes 
show whether the spillover effects of the policy patterns in treated communes could influence 
firms located outside the zone border but still in the treated commune. The estimation results 
should be of interest to policymakers because they can identify whether the impacts of their 
policies extended across their area of administration.  
However, these estimations still neglect the spatial spillover effect of the policy. For 
example, a commune in a control district might receive some effects from a nearby treated 
commune of a treated district. Similarly, a control commune of a treated district might be 
located too far away from the treated commune in the district and thus, might not be influenced. 
In addition, a control commune might be influenced by several treated communes located in 
the surrounding area. To the best of our knowledge, few studies have considered these spatial 
spillover effects from several zones to an untreated area.  
Therefore, we have proposed a new strategy. We first selected all control communes 
during 2000–2007. We developed a set of concentric rings from the center of each control 
commune. The first ring radius was 2 km, and we increased the radius of the consecutive ring 
with a constant step of 2 km. We repeated this s times (s = [1, 49]) until reaching the largest 
ring with a 100 km radius. We counted any IZ/IC located in a commune whose center location 
fell into each ring interval and combined with the earliest treatment time of the IZ/IC (from the 
earliest IZ/IC’s establishment year among those located in the same ring interval) to construct 
a set of 49 ring dummies. Then, we estimated the following equation: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇1𝑠 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑔. 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝2×𝑠,𝑖  ×  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡. 𝐼𝑍. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑2×𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 
+𝜇2𝑠 × 𝐼𝐶. 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑔. 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝2×𝑠,𝑖  ×  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑2×𝑠,𝑖,𝑡  
+𝜇3𝑠 × 𝐼𝑍. 𝐼𝐶. 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑔. 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝2×𝑠,𝑖  × 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑2×𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
17 We used a dummy of specific ownership regardless of the number of IZs/ICs falling into one type of the four. 
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+𝜇4𝑘𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑖𝑡 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,2000 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 
            (7).  
where 𝐼𝑍. 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑔. 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝2×𝑠,𝑖  ×  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡. 𝐼𝑍. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑2×𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 takes 1 if at least one IZ, but no IC, 
is present in any commune whose center is between 2×(s–1) and 2×s kilometers from the center 
of commune i at year t. 𝜇1𝑠 (𝜇2𝑠) showed the spillover effects on the control commune during 
time t when IZ (IC) was the first and only zone located in the ring numbered s. If the ring was 
host to a mixture of IZs and ICs, 𝜇3𝑠 was the corresponding coefficient. Figure 2 illustrates our 
conceptual framework on concentric ring analysis. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
5.3 Heterogeneity and Nickell bias 
One of the challenges is that the establishment of an IC might be correlated with an 
existing IZ. This is because the IZ was already established and has benefited from the central 
government’s policy. The IZ might need some suppliers located nearby or that are industrially 
clustered. The IZ might not be able to accommodate all kinds of suppliers inside the zone due 
to zone-entry conditions. Thus, the local government might have an incentive to install ICs 
next to IZs to serve the needs of the IZ occupants.  
Therefore, we carefully separated the selected sample into five cases: a) treated districts 
with IZs or ICs, which we used for the main reports; b) treated districts with IZs but excluding 
districts having communes with only ICs; c) treated districts with ICs but excluding districts 
having communes with only IZs; d) treated districts hosting only IZs; and e) treated districts 
hosting only ICs. We repeated all estimations from Equations (1)–(5) for b)–e) and have 
reported the results in our appendices. In the case of Equation (7), we repeated all estimations 
with control communes in treated districts and with control communes in control districts. 
One concern when using a short time range panel and several observations is the Nickell 
bias (Nickell, 1981). We followed the suggestions from Angrist and Pischke (2009) and 
conducted additional estimations using a one-year-lagged outcome as a control variable but 
excluding commune fixed effects in the standard ordinary least squared (OLS) method with 
robust commune-clustered standard errors. All other control variables and outcomes were the 
same as Equations (1)–(7). Angrist and Pischke (2009) implied that the real effects lay between 
the coefficients of the OLS and the coefficients of the previous estimations using the commune 
fixed effect. We reported estimations of both specifications in the main results. 
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6. Results 
6.1 The effectiveness of zone policies: direct effects 
First, we find the zone policies to be effective for all formal firms located in the 
administrative unit (commune) as seen in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2. The zone policies 
helped increase the number of formal jobs and firms in the commune hosting the zone. The 
effectiveness emerged immediately following the construction of the zone and was magnified 
once the zone became fully operational. However, we acknowledge that limited information 
on internal labor migration caused us to refrain from further deducting a decrease in 
unemployment in the treated commune.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Second, the zone policies by the central government had different levels of influence in 
formal firms located in the commune compared with zone policies by provincial governments. 
The influence of the central government policies tended to be larger. This could be because of 
either more generous benefits from the central government, economies of scale (the magnitude 
of the coefficient of IZ is often bigger than that of IC), or that IZ-based firms under export 
incentives are more likely to do business with firms located in various areas rather than with 
only those around the zone boundary. 
Third, we found different ownership types of ZID could have different associations 
with local business development in the treated commune (Columns (5) and (7) in Table 2). For 
IZs with private or state-owned ZIDs, the positive association with the number of workers and 
firms tended to become statistically significant. The coefficients for foreign ZIDs are also 
positive and some are statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficients of central 
government agencies are not as pronounced. Perhaps, as a ZID, the private sector, in particular, 
would have more advantages in connecting with local businesses than the government itself. 
Private-sector participants might also be more efficient in developing and managing zones. 
This argument matched with and provided empirical evidence for lessons learnt from the 
history of developing modern SEZs as provided by Akinci et al. (2008). In addition, our 
findings suggest that the influence of private ownership was apparent, regardless of the concern 
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in Akinci et al. (2008)18. However, we acknowledge that we did not consider the endogenous 
decision to grant ZID right to a firm. Besides, a governmental agency might take over the role 
of infrastructure developer if the expected profit does not surpass the cost, which would prove 
unattractive for any potential profit-based infrastructure developer. As a result, limited 
information on the cost of zone development and operation deterred us from conducting further 
cost-benefit analyses. 
Meanwhile, provincial government agencies acting as ZID statistically worked best 
with ICs. However, place-based policies could be very heterogeneous across ICs at a provincial 
level. In addition, we noted that approximately 79% of ICs were under provincial 
administration. One possibility was that the provincial government might be powerful enough 
to drive local firms into one location. Another possibility was related to rent exemption 
incentives. If the specifics of the land rent holiday legalized in 2017 had already been applied 
during 2000–2007, IC-based firms would have been free from land rental costs for 11 years. A 
profit-run ZID cannot wait for 11 years to collect this revenue. Thus, the local government was 
probably the entity best able to afford developing ICs.   
Figure 3 is a graphical visualization on the parallel trend test (base year: 2002). Zero 
falls between the upper and lower confidence intervals in 2001, implying there is no systematic 
difference between treatment and control communes. This confirms the parallel trend condition, 
at least in 2001.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
6.2 Spillover effects of zone policies on local businesses located outside the zone 
boundary 
First, we use only the sample of treatment districts to estimate Equation (5), but the 
outcome variables are net ones (𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿) and 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)). That is, we exclude the 
corresponding zone-based firms from outcome calculations. Table 3 reports the results. We 
find evidence of positive spillover effects of zone policies on local businesses outside the zone 
boundary but within the treated communes. The results for IZs matched findings from Wang 
(2013) for Chinese SEZs. Perhaps, IZ-based firms were more likely to be export firms and did 
                                                 
18 The concern was that the reluctance of local governments to get involved in private zones would have caused 
inadequate investment in infrastructure to connect the zone to the outside, causing the Vietnamese private zone to 
remain vacant. 
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not compete with local firms in the output market. At the same time, the positive spillover 
effects could imply that the positive direct effects are underestimated.  
However, compared with the previous cases, we barely found statistically significant 
effects of IZ policies during the zone construction period. In contrast, they were apparent for 
ICs under construction. Perhaps, ICs were established by provincial governments for the 
benefit of local people. Thus, ICs would have less incentive to prioritize outside partners to 
construct the zone. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In addition, we found IZs and ICs had different effects on local businesses (using the 
outcomes of “net” values), but they were consistent with previous results using the outcomes 
as a “total” value (the ones in Subsection 6.1), especially in eight specific cases of ownership 
as shown in Table 3. IZ communes during the treated period had a higher impact on not only 
local businesses located in the commune, but also those outside the zone boundary, compared 
with IC communes in the corresponding period.  
Next, communes in the “treated” districts and “control” districts are pooled to estimate 
Equation (5). Table 4 reports the results. We found the spillover effect was not limited to local 
businesses located in the treated communes during the treatment period. The effect existed 
even in other communes of the same treated districts when we added communes from control 
districts to the selected sample. Especially, the effect was more pronounced in districts hosting 
both IZs and ICs. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Further, breaking down the ownership of the ZID, we found the spillover effects were 
consistent with all our previous estimations. Private ZIDs worked best among communes 
hosting IZs, as shown in Table 5. In contrast, provincial government agencies offered the best 
alternative among communes with ICs.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
However, we found evidence suggesting an adverse effect of IZ policies on formal 
firms located in control communes of the treated districts (compared with those located in other 
control communes of the “control” districts). As seen in Table 5, coefficients of 
𝐼𝑍. 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 ×  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 ×  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  became statistically 
significant and negative for all outcomes. This showed that formal firms in control communes 
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of treated districts where IZs were under stricter control from the central government would 
have an adverse effect compared with other firms in communes of “control” districts. The 
results may imply the central government policy might have allocated resources to IZs at the 
expense of firms located in control communes. However, it could also be that the central 
government’s benefits attracted firms to relocate from control communes to or close to the zone 
or treated commune.  
Finally, we showed that the spatial spillover effects worked best within a 0–10 km (4-
14 km) distance from the IZ (IC) hosting communes, as shown in Figures 4–5. The spatial 
spillover effects were muted outside the range.  
[Insert Figure 4 and 5 here] 
6.3 Checks on heterogeneity and true estimates considering Nickell bias 
After repeating all estimations in Equation (4) with additional data selections, including 
districts with all IZs, with all ICs, with IZ but no IC, and with IC but no IZ, we found our 
estimation results to be robust and consistent, as seen in Appendices 2–3, 6–7, and 10–13. 
Policies on IZs/ICs had a positive effect on local businesses located in the same commune but 
outside the zone boundary regardless of the data selection. Similarly, the ownership type of 
ZID mattered for the development of local businesses, which was found to be consistently true 
regardless of data selection.  
Finally, as explained in Subsection 5.3, we conducted estimations using a one-year-
lagged outcome as a control variable but excluding commune fixed effects in standard OLS for 
exploring the issue of Nickell bias (we call this “alternative” specification). These estimation 
results are shown in Tables 2-5, respectively. Broadly speaking, our preferred specifications, 
which included commune fixed effects but not lagged outcome variables as control variables, 
yielded coefficients with a larger magnitude in absolute value terms, compared with the 
corresponding “alternative” specifications. Thus, the estimated coefficients using our preferred 
specifications were on the “upper side” while those using the “alternative” specifications were 
rather conservative. However, the qualitative results were very similar between the two 
specifications, and the main findings remain unchanged.   
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7. Conclusions 
We estimated the impact of enterprise zones on local businesses from different aspects, such 
as place-based policies (either corporate tax or land rent exemptions), construction and 
operating periods, and ownership of ZIDs. We found significant (positive) relationships among 
these aspects, along with the growth in employment opportunities and number of formal firms 
both in the treated and control communes of treated districts. Private ZIDs worked best in 
enterprise zones under the regulation of the central government, providing empirical evidence 
of a sustainable model for zone development. Spatial spillover effects from treated communes 
to control communes were found within a range of 0–14 km. 
However, we acknowledge several drawbacks in our study, which should be addressed 
by future research. First, we considered only the stock of firms in a defined area (commune) 
and neglected the entry and exit of firms, which might offer better insight into the impact of 
place-based policies (Chaurey, 2017). However, as the VES sampling method was changed 
from year to year with a lower bound that excluded firms with less than ten employees, we 
were unable to identify whether the disappearance of firms in the data was due to firm exit or 
due to a firm’s reduction in the number of employees. Second, we were unable to consider the 
effects of zones in different set-up periods, such as zones established in the early 1990s, due to 
data limitations. Third, we were aware of, but unable to address, the issues raised by Bertrand 
et al. (2004), indicating that used outcomes would exhibit positive serial autocorrelation, while 
the treated dummies changed very little within the commune. Fourth, we had limited 
information to conduct cost-benefit analyses among zones fully controlled and developed by 
the local (central) government agencies. However, the majority of ZIDs of IZs were private 
(see Table 1), and the larger impacts from private ZIDs suggest that place-based policies were 
probably successful, in general. 
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Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics of treated districts 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(L) 2.603 3.073 0 10.985 
Ln(Firms) 1.366 0.898 0.881 6.246 
Ln(Net L) 2.566 3.059 0 10.985 
Ln(Net firms) 1.355 0.898 0 6.246 
Year 2003.500 2.291 2000 2007 
IZ × treated 0.007 0.086 0 1 
IC × treated 0.012 0.110 0 1 
IZ × under 0.005 0.070 0 1 
IC × under 0.013 0.113 0 1 
IZ × established × POE  0.007 0.086 0 1 
IZ × established × SOE  0.004 0.059 0 1 
IZ × established × FOE  0.001 0.024 0 1 
IZ × established × governmental agency 0.001 0.031 0 1 
IC × established × POE  0.003 0.053 0 1 
IC × established × SOE  0.002 0.040 0 1 
IC × established × FOE  0.000 0.018 0 1 
IC × established × governmental agency  0.019 0.137 0 1 
Baseline 1 (ln(total capital) in 2000 of the commune) 1.536 2.326 0 8.483 
Baseline 2 (ln(sales per worker) in 2000 of the commune) 2.958 4.416 0 13.894 
Baseline 3 (Distance to the nearest international airport in 2000) 98,023 72,199 2,974 314,909 
Baseline 4 (Distance to the nearest seaport in 2000) 113,333 70,639 1,162 336,088 
Number of identical districts 124 
   
Number of identical communes 1,971 
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Appendix 2 Direct effects of IZs and ICs on local formal businesses in treated communes, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated 1.5393*** 0.6347*** 1.4496** 0.6452*** 1.5942*** 0.6422***     
 
(0.3704) (0.1052) (0.5819) (0.1600) (0.4649) (0.1378) 
  
IC × treated 0.0439 0.1681 0.8669*** 0.2938***     1.0372*** 0.3288*** 
 
(0.4963) (0.2054) (0.1919) (0.0637) 
  
(0.2005) (0.0660) 
IZ × under 0.7723** 0.1887** 1.0558* 0.1221 0.6660 0.2177**     
 
(0.3797) (0.0820) (0.5781) (0.1110) (0.4702) (0.1066) 
  
IC × under –0.1848 –0.0604 0.4991*** 0.1053**     0.6647*** 0.1471*** 
 
(0.3712) (0.1078) (0.1789) (0.0465) 
  
(0.1941) (0.0492) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,744 4,744 12,760 12,760 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.397 0.486 0.358 0.486 0.365 0.422 0.343 0.461 
Number of communes 593 593 1,595 1,595 376 376 1,378 1,378 
 
Notes:  
Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
All districts were treated districts sometime between 2003–2007. 
All districts did not have any IZs or ICs until the end of 2002. 
Data selection in column (5) to (8) did not have communes simultaneously hosting IZs and ICs. 
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Appendix 3 Direct effects of IZs and ICs by ZID ownership on treated communes, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection  IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × established × POE 1.4253*** 0.5053*** 1.7546** 0.5467*** 1.2597** 0.4868***      
(0.4243) (0.1219) (0.6927) (0.1899) (0.5100) (0.1545) 
  
IZ × established × SOE 0.8216** 0.3757*** 0.2851 0.2908 0.9809** 0.4052***      
(0.3594) (0.1174) (0.5792) (0.1956) (0.4610) (0.1476) 
  
IZ × established × FOE 0.6983 0.6370*** 0.7345 0.7652*** 0.6024* 0.2817***      
(0.6528) (0.1120) (0.9272) (0.1393) (0.3425) (0.0963) 
  
IZ × established × 
governmental agency 
0.9956* 0.1002 0.9519 0.1011 0.9435 0.0801     
 
(0.5349) (0.1361) (0.5819) (0.1968) (1.0416) (0.0897) 
  
IC × established × POE –0.7271 –0.2180 0.0988 0.1195     0.5564 0.2894**  
(0.6411) (0.1622) (0.4656) (0.1293) 
  
(0.5432) (0.1464) 
IC × established × SOE –1.0246* –0.1669* 0.3010 0.0383     1.3297* 0.1628  
(0.5894) (0.0926) (0.5397) (0.1235) 
  
(0.6876) (0.1969) 
IC × established × FOE 0.8132 –0.0147 0.4289 –0.0477     0.6328* 0.0248  
(0.5317) (0.2432) (0.3079) (0.0921) 
  
(0.3412) (0.0931) 
IC × established × 
governmental agency 
0.3949 0.2823 0.6963*** 0.2230***     0.7450*** 0.2226*** 
 
(0.4500) (0.2118) (0.1732) (0.0541) 
  
(0.1841) (0.0556) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,744 4,744 12,760 12,760 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.397 0.484 0.357 0.485 0.364 0.417 0.342 0.460 
Number of communes 593 593 1,595 1,595 376 376 1,378 1,378 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 4 Mean differences in characteristics in year 2000 between treated and control 
communes among treated districts 
 Treated communes Control communes Difference P–value 
Total capital 30,567.8 17,896.5 12,671.3 0.076 
Ln(sales per worker) 4.4 2.8 1.5 0.000 
Distance to seaport 106,044 114,070 8,025 0.145 
Distance to international airport 92,742 98,557 5,815 0.302 
Number of communes 181 1,790   
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Appendix 5 Parallel trend check among communes located in treated districts 
 Treated district selection IZ or IC 
 
IZ only 
 
IC only   
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IZ commune × year 2000 –0.4715* –0.0574 –0.5900* –0.1101   
 
(0.2584) (0.0581) (0.3281) (0.0731)   
IZ commune × year 2001 –0.3474 –0.2292** –0.3198 –0.2725**   
 
(0.4561) (0.1153) (0.5448) (0.1346)   
IZ commune × year 2003 0.3998* 0.1390** 0.6243* 0.1314*   
 
(0.2263) (0.0543) (0.3353) (0.0741)   
IZ commune × year 2004 0.6528** 0.2481*** 0.7344* 0.2461**   
 
(0.3128) (0.0713) (0.4409) (0.0964)   
IZ commune × year 2005 0.8353** 0.3308*** 0.9178** 0.3182***   
 
(0.3342) (0.0852) (0.4620) (0.1164)   
IZ commune × year 2006 0.9126** 0.3302*** 1.0024** 0.3212**   
 
(0.4003) (0.0966) (0.4970) (0.1271)   
IZ commune × year 2007 1.4528*** 0.5045*** 1.5790*** 0.4937***   
 
(0.3913) (0.1055) (0.5058) (0.1415)   
IC commune × year 2000 –0.7240*** –0.1375***   –0.9201*** –0.1361*** 
 (0.2037) (0.0431)   (0.2298) (0.0465) 
IC commune × year 2001 –0.5413* –0.0839   –0.5258 –0.0684 
 (0.3103) (0.0670)   (0.3520) (0.0731) 
IC commune × year 2003 0.2074 0.0086   0.2296 0.0317 
 (0.1523) (0.0322)   (0.1697) (0.0358) 
IC commune × year 2004 0.4394*** 0.0991***   0.5695*** 0.1347*** 
 (0.1658) (0.0372)   (0.1921) (0.0407) 
IC commune × year 2005 0.3271* 0.1196***   0.4700** 0.1710*** 
 (0.1855) (0.0450)   (0.2146) (0.0496) 
IC commune × year 2006 0.3329* 0.1778***   0.4336** 0.2277*** 
 (0.1855) (0.0496)   (0.2095) (0.0541) 
IC commune × year 2007 0.6735*** 0.2314***   0.8628*** 0.3035*** 
 (0.2113) (0.0596)   (0.2317) (0.0635) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,768 15,768 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.359 0.467 0.368 0.422 0.346 0.464 
Number of communes 1,971 1,971 376 376 1,378 1,378 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 6 Effects of IZs/ICs by ZID ownership on local businesses located in the treated commune but outside the IZ/IC border, by treated 
district selection 
Treated district selection IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated 0.8607** 0.3789*** 0.3845 0.3000* 1.1915** 0.4521***      
(0.3439) (0.1167) (0.3301) (0.1695) (0.5224) (0.1592) 
  
IC × treated –0.0527 0.0538 0.6137*** 0.2154*** 
  
0.7611*** 0.2565*** 
 
(0.4629) (0.1483) (0.1963) (0.0665) 
  
(0.2091) (0.0722) 
IZ × under 0.4848 0.1222 0.9345* 0.0979 0.3398 0.1403 
  
 
(0.3430) (0.0922) (0.5008) (0.1051) (0.4209) (0.1232) 
  
IC × under –0.2121 –0.0715 0.4656*** 0.0878*     0.6339*** 0.1287*** 
 
(0.3528) (0.1036) (0.1739) (0.0460) 
  
(0.1882) (0.0489) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,744 4,744 12,760 12,760 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.387 0.464 0.352 0.472 0.358 0.399 0.339 0.450 
Number of communes 593 593 1,595 1,595 376 376 1,378 1,378 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 7 Effects of IZs/ICs on local businesses located in the treated commune but outside IZ/IC border, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × established × POE 0.8062** 0.2886** 0.5869** 0.1477 0.9085 0.3617*     
 
(0.4030) (0.1376) (0.2856) (0.1837) (0.5805) (0.1845) 
  
IZ × established × SOE 0.3574 0.2186** –0.1597 0.1970 0.5273 0.2259*     
 
(0.3707) (0.1103) (0.8250) (0.2427) (0.4108) (0.1248) 
  
IZ × established × FOE 0.7604 0.6803*** 1.1519** 0.9282*** 0.4365 0.2029*     
 
(0.4962) (0.1248) (0.5408) (0.1745) (0.3835) (0.1113) 
  
IZ × established × governmental agency 1.0139* 0.1100 0.9812* 0.1103 0.9563 0.0882     
 
(0.5324) (0.1297) (0.5614) (0.1925) (1.0585) (0.0914) 
  
IC × established × POE –0.7462 –0.2250 0.1620 0.0682     0.6711 0.2210* 
 
(0.6423) (0.1638) (0.4727) (0.1119) 
  
(0.5362) (0.1197) 
IC × established × SOE –0.8834* –0.1273* 0.3638 0.0485     1.3369* 0.1638 
 
(0.5319) (0.0751) (0.5250) (0.1213) 
  
(0.6934) (0.1943) 
IC × established × FOE 0.8692* 0.1000 0.5469 0.0001     0.7951** 0.0666 
 
(0.5159) (0.1818) (0.3344) (0.0971) 
  
(0.3400) (0.0942) 
IC × established × governmental agency 0.2399 0.1572 0.5144*** 0.1665***     0.5666*** 0.1753*** 
 
(0.4107) (0.1467) (0.1721) (0.0541) 
  
(0.1860) (0.0582) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,744 4,744 12,760 12,760 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.388 0.464 0.352 0.472 0.356 0.397 0.339 0.449 
Number of communes 593 593 1,595 1,595 376 376 1,378 1,378 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 8 Descriptive statistics of sample containing treated districts and all non–treated 
districts 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(L) 2.176 2.987 0 12.227 
Ln(Firms) 1.292 0.890 0.881 7.151 
Ln(Net L) 2.164 2.980 0 12.227 
Ln(Net firms) 1.289 0.889 0 7.151 
Year 2003.500 2.291 2000 2007 
IZ × treated 0.002 0.043 0 1 
IC × treated 0.003 0.055 0 1 
IZ × under 0.001 0.035 0 1 
IC × under  0.003 0.056 0 1 
IZ × established × POE  0.002 0.043 0 1 
IZ × established × SOE  0.001 0.030 0 1 
IZ × established × FOE  0.000 0.012 0 1 
IZ × established × governmental agency 0.000 0.015 0 1 
IC × established × POE  0.001 0.027 0 1 
IC × established × SOE  0.000 0.020 0 1 
IC × established × FOE  0.000 0.009 0 1 
IC × established × governmental agency  0.005 0.069 0 1 
IZ × treated district 0.025 0.155 0 1 
IC × treated district 0.076 0.265 0 1 
IZ–IC × treated district 0.008 0.091 0 1 
IC × treated district × POE – – – – 
IC × treated district × FOE – – – – 
IC × treated district × SOE – – – – 
IC × treated district × governmental agency – – – – 
IZ × treated district × POE 0.018 0.132 0 1 
IZ × treated district × FOE 0.000 0.016 0 1 
IZ × treated district × SOE 0.006 0.078 0 1 
IZ × treated district × governmental agency 0.001 0.032 0 1 
IZ–IC × treated district × POE 0.005 0.070 0 1 
IZ–IC × treated district × FOE 0.001 0.038 0 1 
IZ–IC × treated district × SOE 0.003 0.050 0 1 
IZ–IC × treated district × governmental agency 0.001 0.035 0 1 
Number of identical districts 533 
   
Number of identical communes 7,998 
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Appendix 9 Parallel trend check among communes located in treated districts and other control 
communes in non–treated districts 
 Treated district selection IZ or IC 
 
IZ only 
 
IC only   
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IZ commune × year 2000 –0.6804*** –0.0716 –0.7043** –0.1219*    
(0.2251) (0.0496) (0.3061) (0.0656)   
IZ commune × year 2001 –0.4266 –0.2424** –0.6027 –0.2333    
(0.4325) (0.1161) (0.5677) (0.1450)   
IZ commune × year 2003 0.3901* 0.1448*** 0.5882* 0.1343*    
(0.2035) (0.0494) (0.3158) (0.0698)   
IZ commune × year 2004 0.6036** 0.2460*** 0.6689* 0.2402**    
(0.2892) (0.0698) (0.3991) (0.0942)   
IZ commune × year 2005 0.7542** 0.3090*** 0.9031* 0.3184***    
(0.3290) (0.0847) (0.4595) (0.1151)   
IZ commune × year 2006 0.7847** 0.3209*** 0.8994* 0.3286***    
(0.3947) (0.0979) (0.4856) (0.1257)   
IZ commune × year 2007 1.1854*** 0.4719*** 1.2801*** 0.4679***    
(0.3979) (0.1092) (0.4878) (0.1390)   
IC commune × year 2000 –0.7893*** –0.1394***   –0.8743*** –0.1256*** 
 (0.1891) (0.0410)   (0.2248) (0.0464) 
IC commune × year 2001 –0.7469*** –0.1213**   –0.4681 –0.0256 
 (0.2881) (0.0612)   (0.3400) (0.0707) 
IC commune × year 2003 0.1440 0.0099   0.1867 0.0267 
 (0.1393) (0.0294)   (0.1563) (0.0331) 
IC commune × year 2004 0.3251** 0.0884**   0.5089*** 0.1270*** 
 (0.1515) (0.0344)   (0.1828) (0.0377) 
IC commune × year 2005 0.1785 0.1056**   0.4099* 0.1626*** 
 (0.1759) (0.0430)   (0.2091) (0.0474) 
IC commune × year 2006 0.1174 0.1553***   0.3236 0.2155*** 
 (0.1764) (0.0485)   (0.2035) (0.0543) 
IC commune × year 2007 0.4253** 0.1951***   0.7079*** 0.2725*** 
 (0.1989) (0.0566)   (0.2250) (0.0611) 
IZ/IC district × year 2003 0.1929*** 0.0163 0.0885 –0.0583* 0.2140** 0.0040  
(0.0646) (0.0122) (0.1627) (0.0321) (0.0924) (0.0137) 
IZ/IC district × year 2004 0.3292*** 0.0300*** 0.6388*** 0.0489 0.2896*** –0.0041  
(0.0556) (0.0105) (0.1621) (0.0348) (0.0750) (0.0120) 
IZ/IC district × year 2005 0.4513*** 0.0503*** 0.8858*** 0.1086*** 0.3966*** 0.0094  
(0.0534) (0.0104) (0.1798) (0.0372) (0.0844) (0.0157) 
IZ/IC district × year 2006 0.6110*** 0.0883*** 1.4288*** 0.2184*** 0.9557*** 0.0827***  
(0.0552) (0.0118) (0.2147) (0.0500) (0.1097) (0.0206) 
IZ/IC district × year 2007 0.8453*** 0.1339*** 2.0782*** 0.3306*** 1.5311*** 0.2058***  
(0.0572) (0.0133) (0.2304) (0.0569) (0.1186) (0.0246) 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63,984 63,984 3,008 3,008 11,024 11,024 
R–squared 0.184 0.287 0.234 0.283 0.255 0.349 
Number of communes 7,998 7,998 376 376 1,378 1,378 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 10 Effects of IZs/ICs on formal businesses located in the treated communes compared with those in non–treated districts  
Treated district selection IZ or IC  IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IZ × treated 1.5190*** 0.6772*** 1.5134*** 0.6744*** 1.5726** 0.7239*** 1.4830*** 0.6536***     
 
(0.3997) (0.1138) (0.3958) (0.1130) (0.6511) (0.1569) (0.4943) (0.1511) 
  
IC × treated 0.7500*** 0.2804*** –0.0490 0.2335 0.7418*** 0.2797***     0.8683*** 0.2918*** 
 
(0.1815) (0.0584) (0.4162) (0.1695) (0.1817) (0.0584) 
  
(0.1938) (0.0622) 
IZ × under 0.5171 0.1274 0.5274 0.1311 0.7770 0.0564 0.4053 0.1644     
 
(0.3958) (0.0869) (0.3957) (0.0867) (0.5805) (0.0957) (0.5084) (0.1187) 
  
IC × under 0.2884* 0.0739* –0.2745 –0.1017 0.2876* 0.0757*     0.4077** 0.1129** 
 
(0.1667) (0.0443) (0.3178) (0.1132) (0.1670) (0.0443) 
  
(0.1893) (0.0465) 
IZ × treated district 0.4984*** 0.0460* 0.4726*** 0.0440* 0.7038*** 0.1264*** 0.4123*** 0.0237     
 
(0.0956) (0.0238) (0.0982) (0.0246) (0.1534) (0.0333) (0.1161) (0.0291) 
  
IC × treated district 0.5639*** 0.0783*** 0.5456*** 0.1170*** 0.5495*** 0.0761***     0.5431*** 0.0735*** 
 
(0.0497) (0.0102) (0.1404) (0.0419) (0.0499) (0.0103) 
  
(0.0522) (0.0106) 
IZ–IC × treated district 0.9558*** 0.2034*** 1.0072*** 0.2217*** 0.9501*** 0.2085***         
 
(0.1183) (0.0318) (0.1270) (0.0346) (0.1258) (0.0334) 
    
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63,984 63,984 52,960 52,960 60,976 60,976 51,224 51,224 59,240 59,240 
R–squared 0.182 0.287 0.176 0.279 0.183 0.292 0.169 0.263 0.178 0.279 
Number of communes 7,998 7,998 6,620 6,620 7,622 7,622 6,403 6,403 7,405 7,405 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 11 Effects of IZs/ICs by ZID ownership on formal businesses located in the treated communes compared with those in non–treated 
districts, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection IZ or IC  IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IZ × established × POE 1.3847*** 0.5167*** 1.3569*** 0.5135*** 1.6621** 0.5323*** 1.2436** 0.5066***      
(0.4744) (0.1370) (0.4722) (0.1365) (0.8188) (0.1913) (0.5732) (0.1793) 
  
IZ × established× SOE 0.5604 0.3966*** 0.6148 0.4000*** 0.0991 0.3241** 0.7658 0.4258***     
 
(0.4022) (0.1121) (0.3942) (0.1130) (0.5231) (0.1650) (0.5065) (0.1415) 
  
IZ × established × FOE 0.3618 0.5882*** 0.3161 0.5656*** 0.6276 0.7633*** 0.6764** 0.2865***     
 
(0.9941) (0.2170) (1.0128) (0.2144) (1.1498) (0.1378) (0.3276) (0.1024) 
  
IZ × established × 
governmental agency 
0.6805 0.0324 0.7405 0.0310 0.5936 0.0264 0.5421 –0.0533     
 
(0.5802) (0.1182) (0.5509) (0.1190) (0.6756) (0.1514) (0.9588) (0.0886) 
  
IC × established × POE 0.5626* 0.1332 –0.1632 –0.1366 0.5672* 0.1358     0.8641** 0.2488* 
 
(0.3282) (0.1096) (0.6110) (0.1068) (0.3292) (0.1099) 
  
(0.3549) (0.1355) 
IC × established × SOE 0.3886 0.0681 –0.6970 –0.0070 0.4317 0.0777     1.1206*** 0.1183 
 
(0.4300) (0.1152) (0.4352) (0.0988) (0.3972) (0.1176) 
  
(0.4118) (0.1826) 
IC × established × FOE 0.0357 –0.1013 –0.0720 –0.3665** 0.0343 –0.1062     0.8731*** 0.1928*** 
 
(0.5945) (0.1908) (0.3948) (0.1792) (0.5989) (0.1948) 
  
(0.1820) (0.0513) 
IC × established × 
governmental agency 
0.8382*** 0.2457*** 0.2127 0.2895 0.8233*** 0.2444***     0.8919*** 0.2420*** 
 
(0.1690) (0.0494) (0.4025) (0.1779) (0.1694) (0.0494) 
  
(0.1811) (0.0511) 
IZ × treated district × POE 0.6300*** 0.1111*** 0.6573*** 0.1173*** 0.5503*** 0.1256*** 0.6654*** 0.1144***     
 
(0.1232) (0.0292) (0.1278) (0.0307) (0.1682) (0.0404) (0.1593) (0.0380) 
  
IZ × treated district × SOE 0.2657 –0.0782* 0.3226* –0.0646 1.0072* –0.0336 0.2520 –0.0680     
 
(0.1675) (0.0431) (0.1663) (0.0430) (0.5530) (0.0418) (0.1763) (0.0475) 
  
IZ × treated district × FOE 0.8864 0.1193 0.8842 0.1245 1.1642* 0.1988* –1.3140*** –0.3726***     
 
(0.6065) (0.1139) (0.6059) (0.1135) (0.6270) (0.1107) (0.3268) (0.1022) 
  
IZ × treated district × 
governmental agency 
–0.8594*** –0.2876*** –0.8070*** –0.2721*** 0.0365 0.0070 –1.0038*** –0.3379***     
 
(0.1721) (0.0703) (0.1719) (0.0696) (0.2752) (0.0620) (0.1961) (0.0833) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IZ–IC × treated district × POE 0.6995*** 0.1860*** 0.8070*** 0.2031*** 0.6484*** 0.1823***          
(0.1259) (0.0371) (0.1277) (0.0374) (0.1318) (0.0381) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × SOE 0.9258*** 0.1064** 0.9907*** 0.1143** 0.9478*** 0.1077**         
 
(0.2272) (0.0472) (0.2289) (0.0477) (0.2367) (0.0480) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × FOE 0.6326 0.1945* 0.6285 0.2143* 0.6581 0.1940         
 
(0.4785) (0.1162) (0.4910) (0.1180) (0.4843) (0.1183) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × 
governmental agency 
0.0339 0.0820 0.1606 0.0924 0.1520 0.1217         
 
(0.1800) (0.1025) (0.1770) (0.1039) (0.1997) (0.1095) 
    
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63,984 63,984 52,960 52,960 60,976 60,976 51,224 51,224 59,240 59,240 
R–squared 0.179 0.286 0.177 0.280 0.179 0.291 0.170 0.264 0.173 0.277 
Number of communes 7,998 7,998 6,620 6,620 7,622 7,622 6,403 6,403 7,405 7,405 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 12 Spillover effects of IZs/ICs on formal businesses located in the treated communes but outside the IZ/IC compared with those in non–
treated districts, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated 0.9100** 0.4432*** 0.6573* 0.4341*** 1.0452** 0.4520***     
 
(0.3601) (0.1206) (0.3563) (0.1624) (0.5252) (0.1648) 
  
IC × treated –0.0905 0.1696 0.5385*** 0.2263***     0.6403*** 0.2398*** 
 
(0.4437) (0.1175) (0.1895) (0.0617) 
  
(0.2045) (0.0687) 
IZ × under  0.2971 0.0710 0.7869 0.0607 0.0783 0.0769     
 
(0.3440) (0.0938) (0.5392) (0.0971) (0.4209) (0.1297) 
  
IC × under –0.1057 –0.0551 0.3211* 0.0832*     0.4171** 0.1134** 
 
(0.3521) (0.1135) (0.1665) (0.0427) 
  
(0.1866) (0.0446) 
IZ × treated district 0.3258*** 0.0001 0.4492*** 0.0473 0.2824** –0.0122     
 
(0.0948) (0.0240) (0.1525) (0.0401) (0.1113) (0.0280) 
  
IC × treated district 0.3502** 0.0601 0.3872*** 0.0320***     0.3811*** 0.0296*** 
 
(0.1398) (0.0395) (0.0495) (0.0104) 
  
(0.0516) (0.0107) 
IZ–IC × treated district 0.7768*** 0.1580*** 0.7158*** 0.1425***         
 
(0.1323) (0.0360) (0.1305) (0.0341) 
    
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,960 52,960 60,976 60,976 51,224 51,224 59,240 59,240 
R–squared 0.192 0.310 0.199 0.323 0.187 0.296 0.195 0.311 
Number of communes 6,620 6,620 7,622 7,622 6,403 6,403 7,405 7,405 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 13 Spillover effects of IZs/ICs by ZID ownership on formal businesses located in the treated communes but outside the IZ/IC border 
compared with those in non–treated districts, by treated district selection 
Treated district selection IZ  IC  IZ only  IC only  
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × established × POE 0.8661* 0.3319** 0.9377** 0.2778 0.8518 0.3548*     
 
(0.4453) (0.1545) (0.3709) (0.1707) (0.6345) (0.2133) 
  
IZ × established × SOE 0.1262 0.2109* –0.5414 0.2255 0.3137 0.2065*     
 
(0.3346) (0.1109) (0.7293) (0.2484) (0.3937) (0.1217) 
  
IZ × established × FOE 0.2059 0.6251** 0.4972 0.8847*** 0.4867 0.2027*     
 
(0.6445) (0.3023) (0.4837) (0.2724) (0.3625) (0.1219) 
  
IZ × established × governmental 
agency 
0.7945 0.0715 0.7287 0.0025 0.6038 0.1427*     
 
(0.4837) (0.1254) (0.6035) (0.1892) (0.7608) (0.0829) 
  
IC × established × POE –0.1758 –0.2313* 0.2816 –0.0057     0.4507 0.0894 
 
(0.5741) (0.1332) (0.2920) (0.0933) 
  
(0.3243) (0.1059) 
IC × established × SOE –0.9059** 0.0162 0.2391 0.0259     0.9591** 0.0375 
 
(0.4406) (0.1298) (0.4426) (0.1065) 
  
(0.4873) (0.1514) 
IC × established × FOE 0.6656 –0.0114 0.8325* 0.1035*     1.4511*** 0.1538*** 
 
(0.4233) (0.1554) (0.4614) (0.0619) 
  
(0.1857) (0.0556) 
IC × established × governmental 
agency 
0.1383 0.2852* 0.5809*** 0.2029***     0.6255*** 0.1954*** 
 
(0.4255) (0.1578) (0.1739) (0.0528) 
  
(0.1863) (0.0558) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated district × POE 0.5234*** 0.0501 0.2665 0.0885 0.5528*** 0.0429     
 
(0.1220) (0.0318) (0.1746) (0.0552) (0.1500) (0.0377) 
  
IZ × treated district × SOE 0.1839 –0.0465 0.9667* –0.0798 0.0979 –0.0428     
 
(0.1664) (0.0417) (0.5438) (0.0494) (0.1770) (0.0458) 
  
IZ × treated district × FOE 0.8422 0.1537 1.0813* 0.2443** –1.1460*** –0.3819***     
 
(0.5966) (0.1259) (0.6314) (0.1180) (0.3582) (0.1201) 
  
IZ × treated district × governmental 
agency 
–0.8101*** –0.2839*** –0.2155 –0.0306 –0.9629*** –0.3481***     
 
(0.1729) (0.0602) (0.2871) (0.0583) (0.2028) (0.0710) 
  
IZ–IC × treated district × POE 0.5327*** 0.1690*** 0.3368** 0.1722***         
 
(0.1386) (0.0443) (0.1452) (0.0460) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × SOE 0.8288*** 0.0692 0.7626*** 0.0607         
 
(0.2373) (0.0538) (0.2471) (0.0535) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × FOE 0.5262 0.3104** 0.5645 0.2831**         
 
(0.4841) (0.1256) (0.4766) (0.1257) 
    
IZ–IC × treated district × 
governmental agency 
–0.1016 0.0372 –0.1722 0.0807         
 
(0.1964) (0.1068) (0.2226) (0.1121) 
    
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,960 52,960 60,976 60,976 51,224 51,224 59,240 59,240 
R–squared 0.148 0.265 0.148 0.269 0.142 0.252 0.143 0.258 
Number of communes 6,620 6,620 7,622 7,622 6,403 6,403 7,405 7,405 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Appendix 14 Spatial spillover effect of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ formal employment 
among treated districts 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value.
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Appendix 15 Spatial spillover effect of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ number of firms 
among treated districts 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value. 
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Appendix 16 Spatial spillover effect of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ formal employment 
among non–treated districts 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value.
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Appendix 17 Spatial spillover effect of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ number of firms 
among non–treated districts 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value. 
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Table 1 IZs and ICs as of July 2007 
 IZ    IC    
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Year of establishment 2001.40 1991 2007 2003.69 1996 2007 
Year started/expected in operation 2002.68 1992 2013 2005.56 1997 2012 
Area in the masterplan (ha) 336.29 3.82 10,000 69.43 1.1 2,111.29 
Area for lease (ha) 194.34 0 2,816.26 33.40 0 2,111.29 
 IZ    IC   
Status       
    In operation 144   189   
    Under construction 35   76   
Classification       
    Industrial (manufacturing) zone 173   17   
    Export processing zone 4   2   
    High–technology zone 0   1   
    Economic zone 2   3   
    Industrial cluster/ industrial village  0   242   
Ownership of ZID       
      POE 78   33   
      SOE 62   23   
      FOE 25   3   
      Government agency 18   196   
Total 179   265   
 
Notes:  
ZID can be structured as a partnership. 
Exclusions:  
• All IZs/ICs that were established but not yet under construction in July 2007, based on the Vietnamese 
Establishment Census Survey.  
• Eighteen units appeared with the word “industrial park” in their names but were not established by either 
the central or provincial governments. 
• One unit that ceased operation.
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Table 2 Effects of IZs/ECs on the local formal businesses located in the treated communes  
VARIABLES Ln(L) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(Firms) Ln(L) Ln(L) Ln(Firms) Ln(Firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated 1.5587*** 0.9104*** 0.6522*** 0.2957***        
(0.3631) (0.2189) (0.1039) (0.0475) 
 
 
 
 
IC × treated 0.8709*** 0.7055*** 0.2968*** 0.1626***        
(0.1913) (0.1259) (0.0637) (0.0382) 
 
 
 
 
IZ × under 0.7921** 0.6278*** 0.1908** 0.1030**        
(0.3738) (0.2263) (0.0818) (0.0438) 
 
 
 
 
IC × under 0.4985*** 0.3608*** 0.1059** 0.0463        
(0.1781) (0.1272) (0.0464) (0.0370) 
 
 
 
 
IZ × established × POE       1.4341*** 0.8460*** 0.5154*** 0.2337***   
 
 
 (0.4093) (0.2064) (0.1198) (0.0480) 
IZ × established × SOE       0.8263** 0.6476*** 0.3829*** 0.2030***   
 
 
 (0.3738) (0.1845) (0.1190) (0.0540) 
IZ × established × FOE       0.8941 0.8141 0.7221*** 0.2733**   
 
 
 (0.6804) (0.6543) (0.1132) (0.1113) 
IZ × established × governmental agency       0.9280* 0.4786 0.0788 0.0301   
 
 
 (0.5428) (0.3856) (0.1275) (0.0654) 
IC × established × POE       0.1053 0.5052 0.1164 0.1414*   
 
 
 (0.4647) (0.3279) (0.1291) (0.0753) 
IC × established × SOE       0.2070 0.3445 0.0155 0.0213   
 
 
 (0.5474) (0.3001) (0.1205) (0.0715) 
IC × established × FOE       0.4594 –0.2373 –0.0276 –0.2414***   
 
 
 (0.2895) (0.2493) (0.0859) (0.0600) 
IC × established × governmental agency       0.6964*** 0.5213*** 0.2254*** 0.1134***   
 
 
 (0.1735) (0.1091) (0.0544) (0.0332) 
Previous year outcome No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 
R–squared 0.357 0.724 0.467 0.845 0.356 0.724 0.465 0.845 
Number of communes 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). We used standard OLS for (3), (4), (7), and (8).
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Table 3 Effects of IZs/ICs on the local formal businesses located in the treated communes but outside the IZ/IC border 
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net 
firms) 
Ln(Net L) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net 
firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IZ × treated 0.8858*** 0.5937*** 0.3975*** 0.2069*** 
 
 
 
  
(0.3399) (0.1975) (0.1160) (0.0562) 
 
 
 
 
IC × treated 0.6137*** 0.4939*** 0.2169*** 0.1240*** 
 
 
 
  
(0.1959) (0.1376) (0.0663) (0.0433) 
 
 
 
 
IZ × under 0.5011 0.4138* 0.1224 0.0702 
 
 
 
  
(0.3370) (0.2167) (0.0924) (0.0532) 
 
 
 
 
IC × under 0.4650*** 0.3628*** 0.0881* 0.0360 
 
 
 
  
(0.1733) (0.1272) (0.0459) (0.0367) 
 
 
 
 
IZ × established × POE 
 
 
 
 0.8143** 0.4883** 0.2996** 0.1465**   
 
 
 (0.3921) (0.2041) (0.1364) (0.0589) 
IZ × established × SOE 
 
 
 
 0.3629 0.4634** 0.2254** 0.1605***   
 
 
 (0.3758) (0.2094) (0.1106) (0.0590) 
IZ × established × FOE 
 
 
 
 0.9865* 0.8629 0.7708*** 0.2934***   
 
 
 (0.5186) (0.5494) (0.1322) (0.0931) 
IZ × established × governmental agency 
 
 
 
 0.9533* 0.4919 0.0878 0.0335   
 
 
 (0.5376) (0.3803) (0.1246) (0.0638) 
IC × established × POE 
 
 
 
 0.1687 0.5274 0.0652 0.1259*   
 
 
 (0.4710) (0.3319) (0.1113) (0.0727) 
IC × established × SOE 
 
 
 
 0.2860 0.3921 0.0384 0.0314   
 
 
 (0.5229) (0.2905) (0.1142) (0.0708) 
IC × established × FOE 
 
 
 
 0.5879* –0.1191 0.0225 –0.2125***   
 
 
 (0.3137) (0.2513) (0.0884) (0.0626) 
IC × established × governmental agency 
 
 
 
 0.5146*** 0.4005*** 0.1687*** 0.0843**   
 
 
 (0.1752) (0.1138) (0.0548) (0.0347) 
Previous year outcome No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 15,768 13,797 
R–squared 0.351 0.723 0.451 0.839 0.350 0.723 0.451 0.839 
Number of communes 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). We used standard OLS for (3), (4), (7), and (8).
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Table 4 Spillover effect of IZs/ICs on local businesses located in the treated communes but 
outside the IZ/IC border compared with non–treated communes 
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IZ × treated 0.9775*** 0.6486*** 0.4611*** 0.2409***  
(0.3614) (0.1909) (0.1193) (0.0508) 
IC × treated 0.5421*** 0.4222*** 0.2259*** 0.1109***  
(0.1815) (0.1208) (0.0621) (0.0366) 
IZ × under  0.2540 0.2328 0.0571 0.0214  
(0.3560) (0.2129) (0.0936) (0.0502) 
IC × under 0.2755* 0.2292** 0.0694 0.0249  
(0.1630) (0.1096) (0.0442) (0.0310) 
IZ × treated district 0.4657*** 0.1392*** 0.0364 0.0092  
(0.0935) (0.0486) (0.0239) (0.0114) 
IC × treated district 0.5507*** 0.1092*** 0.0746*** 0.0069  
(0.0497) (0.0277) (0.0103) (0.0056) 
IZ–IC × treated district 0.9741*** 0.2941*** 0.2079*** 0.0856***  
(0.1193) (0.0706) (0.0321) (0.0179) 
Previous year outcome No Yes No Yes 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Observations 63,984 55,986 63,984 55,986 
R–squared 0.180 0.705 0.283 0.822 
Number of communes 7,998 7,998 7,998 7,998 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). We used 
standard OLS for (3), (4), (7), and (8). 
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Table 5 Spillover effect of IZs/ICs by ZID ownership on local businesses located in the treated 
communes but outside the IZ/IC border compared with non–treated communes 
 
VARIABLES Ln(Net L) Ln(Net L) Ln(Net firms) Ln(Net firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IZ × established × POE 0.8497* 0.4841** 0.3203** 0.1551***  
(0.4629) (0.2110) (0.1483) (0.0581) 
IZ × established × SOE 0.1460 0.4120** 0.2478*** 0.1649***  
(0.3196) (0.2012) (0.0939) (0.0570) 
IZ × established × FOE 0.5445 0.5862 0.6532*** 0.2253***  
(0.8977) (0.6010) (0.2311) (0.0809) 
IZ × established × governmental agency 0.7001 0.3077 0.0374 0.0113  
(0.5733) (0.3221) (0.1168) (0.0559) 
IC × established × POE 0.5248* 0.4861** 0.0856 0.0961*  
(0.2868) (0.2205) (0.0895) (0.0518) 
IC × established× SOE 0.4395 0.1938 0.0848 0.0477  
(0.4071) (0.2726) (0.1181) (0.0845) 
IC × established × FOE 0.1932 –0.2310 –0.0626 –0.2368***  
(0.6024) (0.4015) (0.1927) (0.0768) 
IC × established × governmental agency 0.6720*** 0.3477*** 0.2072*** 0.0732*** 
 (0.1671) (0.0978) (0.0521) (0.0284) 
IZ.established × treated district × POE 0.5850*** 0.1814*** 0.0997*** 0.0248* 
 (0.1202) (0.0594) (0.0294) (0.0131) 
IZ.established × treated district × SOE 0.2791* 0.1048 –0.0774* –0.0148 
 (0.1666) (0.0868) (0.0431) (0.0240) 
IZ.established × treated district × FOE 0.8995 0.5024 0.1224 0.0196 
 (0.6015) (0.5539) (0.1128) (0.0867) 
IZ.established × treated district × 
governmental agency 
–0.8629*** –0.7277*** –0.2888*** –0.1890*** 
 (0.1719) (0.1080) (0.0704) (0.0394) 
IZ–IC.established × treated district × 
POE 
0.7051*** 0.3124*** 0.1828*** 0.1050*** 
 (0.1294) (0.0850) (0.0376) (0.0222) 
IZ–IC.established × treated district × 
SOE 
0.9076*** 0.4032*** 0.1086** 0.0536 
 (0.2263) (0.1358) (0.0478) (0.0338) 
IZ–IC.established × treated district × 
FOE 
0.6769 –0.1989 0.2139* –0.0046 
 (0.4776) (0.2492) (0.1171) (0.0542) 
IZ–IC.established × treated district × 
governmental agency 
0.0413 0.1463 0.0823 0.0864* 
 (0.1807) (0.1412) (0.1016) (0.0455) 
Previous year outcome No Yes No Yes 
Baseline 1–4 × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Observations 63,984 55,986 63,984 55,986 
R–squared 0.177 0.705 0.283 0.822 
Number of communes 7,998 7,998 7,998 7,998 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at commune-level in brackets. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). We used 
standard OLS for (3), (4), (7), and (8).
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework for treated and control communes  
The first data selection 
Treated district 
Treated commune 
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Control district 
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“Placebo” communes 
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework of concentric ring analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:   Mu_is is 𝜇𝑖𝑠 in equation (7) where i = [1, 3]
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Figure 3 Pre-trend checks  
 
Note: Data were obtained from the corresponding coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix 5. 
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Figure 4 Spatial spillover effects of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ formal employment 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value.
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Figure 5 Spatial spillover effect of IZs/ICs on non–treated communes’ number of firms 
 
Note: lb (ub) is lower (upper) bound at 2–SD from the coefficient value.  
